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A Vinter Retreat in Europe:  Returning to the Issue of Whole Life Sentences in Strasbourg  
Abstract: 
In Vinter and Others v United Kingdom (2013), the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human 
Rights held that domestic procedures for reviewing whole life prison sentences in England & Wales 
were in breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In response, the domestic 
Court of Appeal declined to revise those procedures, or the material relating to them, and held that 
the Grand Chamber was incorrect in its finding; the law did in fact give prisoners hope for future 
release. Rather than reasserting the reasoning and findings of Vinter, the Grand Chamber has been 
appeased by the clarification offered by the UK court (Hutchinson v United Kingdom 2017). The 
contradictions in that retreat from the Vinter judgement are analysed here and the future standing 
of the court is prophesised in relation to that decision. 
Keywords: whole life sentencing; European Court of Human Rights; Hutchinson v United Kingdom; 
Vinter and Others v United Kingdom  
Introduction: 
…the extraordinary attachment of the English to their system of law 
(if indeed it can be called a system), the positive affection it inspires, 
the awe inspiring confidence, often unwarranted, which they repose 
in its ability to do justice, the tenacity, indeed ferocity with which 
they refuse to modify it with foreign importations is one of the most 
important national characteristics (Johnson 2010 cited in Grieve 
2014) 
After the judgement rendered by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
in Vinter v United Kingdom (2013), the British government was put on notice that the Strasbourg 
court viewed the release mechanism from a whole life order in England & Wales as unsatisfactory. 
Specifically, the chamber held that a person sentenced to whole life imprisonment had the right to 
know, at the time of sentencing, what he or she needed to do to be considered for release from the 
order and, pivotally, that the current release mechanism was unsatisfactorily vague. The UK 
response was one of defiance, legally and politically. Domestically familiar opinions were expressed 
by a range of politicians and commentators that the ECHR was, unacceptably, intruding upon British 
sovereignty and going beyond the scope of what was intended by the founders of the European 
Convention. In a legal response, in R v McLoughlin (2014), the Court of Appeal specifically addressed 
the concerns of the Vinter court, clarifying and restating their view on English law, and the adequate, 
albeit restrictive, in their view, release mechanism for whole life tariff prisoners. The law remained 
unchanged whilst domestic views on the Strasbourg court became increasingly negative, 
corresponding to a strengthening opinion of nationalism; English law should be decided at home, 
and not abroad. So, it was somewhat of a pressure release on the tensions between Strasbourg and 
Westminster when, in 2015, the Fourth Section of the ECHR decided in a case that raised many of 
the same points as Vinter, Hutchinson v United Kingdom, that the domestic system regarding the 
review and release of whole life prisoners was in fact adequate and did not amount to a breach of 
Article 3 of the European Convention. The referral was accepted by the Grand Chamber and, in 
January 2017, in a reversal of the opinion and views that characterised the Vinter decision, it held 
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that, even without a change in the law, and without any written amendments to the instruments 
governing release of whole life tariff prisoners, the current system in England & Wales was 
sufficiently clear. For the time being, after a period of discontent with the ECHR that has been 
characterised by political threats to withdraw from the remit of the court, the British government 
has been placated. Although such appeasement may not, in the long term, be enough to keep the 
UK party to the European Convention and remit of the court, the ECHR has tentatively moved 
towards an unbalanced arrangement whereby the ‘bigger players’ within Europe are treated with 
greater leniency and afforded a wider margin of appreciation than smaller, newer, and less politically 
influential nations. 
Part one of this paper overviews the decision of the Grand Chamber in Vinter and Others v United 
Kingdom (2013) and the British response to that ruling. The second part examines the case of 
Hutchinson v United Kingdom (2015) in the Fourth Section of the ECHR as a temporary pacifier to 
the tensioned relations between Strasbourg and Westminster. The third part of the paper then 
reviews the Grand Chamber ruling in Hutchinson before concluding with a reflection on the standing 
of the Court and its possible future relationship with the UK, and other European nations.    
 
Part 1: Vinter and Others v United Kingdom 
The judgement recognises, implicitly, that hope is an important and 
constitutive aspect of the human person. Those who commit the 
most abhorrent and egregious of acts and who inflict untold 
suffering upon others, nevertheless retain their fundamental 
humanity and carry within themselves the capacity to change. Long 
and deserved though their prison sentences may be, they retain the 
right to hope that, someday, they may have atoned for the wrongs 
which they have committed. They ought not to be deprived entirely 
of such hope. To deny them the experience of hope would be to 
deny a fundamental aspect of their humanity and, to do that, would 
be degrading (Judge Power-Forde, Vinter and Others v United 
Kingdom cited in Van Zyl Smit, Weatherby, and Creighton 2014:66).  
In Vinter, the appellants asserted that their whole life sentences amounted to ill treatment contrary 
to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights; a claim which rested upon the denial of 
their future prospect for release. In its judgement, the Grand Chamber held that, not only do 
detainees under a whole life order have the right to a sentence review but also a prospect for future 
release. Whilst the court did not explicitly state a definitive time frame for review, drawing upon 
international standards, it contended the appropriateness of a twenty five year point: 
 …the Court would also observe that the comparative and 
international law materials before it show clear support for the 
institution of a dedicated mechanism guaranteeing a review no later 
than twenty-five years after the imposition of a life sentence, with 
further periodic reviews thereafter (Vinter and Others v United 
Kingdom 2013 at 68) 
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At the time of Vinter, and still now, the release procedures for whole life tariff prisoners are to be 
found in the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, under which the Secretary of State may order the release 
of a prisoner on compassionate grounds. Those grounds are specified, restricted, by the Prison 
Service Orders (Chapter 12, Prison Service Order 4700) to cases where the offender is terminally ill 
and physically incapacitated. The Vinter court had reservations whether such a limited power for 
release would ensure that prisoners, for whom there was no continued penological justification for 
their imprisonment, actually had a real prospect for release. When a whole life order is imposed, the 
penological justifications for that order, requirements of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation, will not remain static and will shift over time. A comprehensive review is therefore 
required, suggested at twenty five years, to determine whether those justifications remain for 
keeping the prisoner detained under a whole life order. Moreover, a clear review mechanism should 
be in place at the time the prisoner is sentenced so he or she can know what is required of them to 
be considered for future release. When such a review, and mechanism, is absent, whole life 
prisoners are denied a real prospect of release in contravention of Article 3.   
In Britain, the legal response to the Vinter judgement was rendered in R v McLoughlin (2014). In its 
ruling, the Court of Appeal specifically rejected the view of the Grand Chamber that section 30 of the 
Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 was unclear and therefore did not provide an adequate means for a 
prisoner to demonstrate that his or her continued imprisonment was no longer justified. In fact, the 
Court of Appeal was explicit in its reasoning that domestic law did provide ‘hope’ or ‘possibility’ for 
release of whole life sentenced prisoners at some point. 
It is entirely consistent with the rule of law that such requests [for 
release] are considered on an individual basis against the criteria 
that circumstances have exceptionally changed so as to render the 
original punishment which was justifiable no longer justifiable. We 
find it difficult to specify in advance what such circumstances might 
be, given that the heinous nature of the original crime justly 
required punishment by imprisonment for life. But circumstances 
can and do change in exceptional cases. The interpretation of s.30 
we have set out provides for that possibility and hence gives to each 
such prisoner the possibility of exceptional release (Lord Thomas, R 
v McLoughlin 2014 at 36) 
Whilst the Grand Chamber asserted that a prisoner is entitled to know what efforts he can make to 
be considered for release, both the legal and political response were of one voice: nothing, at least 
nothing that has been specified. Section 30 of the Crime (Sentences) Act (1997) refers to the power 
to release a life sentenced prisoner on compassionate grounds. The relevant Prison Order states that 
a prisoner must be bedridden with a prognosis of 3 months or less to live; this is not a state an 
individual can strive for. Perversely, such a state is one to naturally be avoided, and it is certainly not 
one that can be brought about by a prisoner through rehabilitative efforts; terminal illness can 
provide no hope.  
Despite this fallacy, the political response to Vinter, noteworthy as the whole life tariff in England 
and Wales is fiercely political – any release decision still rests with the executive rather than the 
judiciary or an independent review panel or parole board - affirmed the legal response, in the most 
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vociferous terms. In context, the Vinter decision was the latest in a procession of decisions from the 
Strasbourg court that resonated negatively in Britain. The year following the Vinter decision, the 
Conservative party, in their preliminary campaign for the 2015 general election, published a 
manifesto for their plans to repeal the UK Human Rights Act and thus break the country’s link to the 
European Court of Human Rights. Underpinned by the contention of mission creep of the court, the 
paper lists Strasbourg decisions regarding prisoner voting, artificial insemination, prisoner 
extradition, and whole life sentencing as reasons to withdraw from the remit of the court 
(Conservatives 2014:3). Even before the unfavourable Grand Chamber judgement in Vinter, the 
Home Secretary announced a national need for a plan to ‘deal with’ the ECHR (BBC News: 2013), 
whilst Prime Minister, David Cameron, added further weight to the strength of opinion against the 
court, 
As a prime minister, what I want to know is can I keep our country 
safe. For instance, are we able to chuck out of our country people 
who have no right to be here, who threaten our country. I say we 
should be able to do that. Whatever that takes, we must deliver that 
outcome. And this is what I think we have the next 20 months to do, 
and put in our manifesto. (Prime Minister David Cameron, cited in 
Kirkup, 2013) 
On the Vinter decision, in particular, David Cameron was quoted as, “very, very, very, very 
disappointed … profoundly disagree(ing) with the court’s ruling … a strong supporter of whole life 
tariffs” (Watt and Travis, 2013). Meanwhile, the then Justice Secretary, Chris Grayling, sent a formal 
note to the Council of Europe, asserting British sovereignty, that the UK Supreme Court should be 
the final arbiter of the law and, tellingly, that whole life tariff prisoners would not be receiving 
reviews of their sentences (Kern, 2014). Such an assertion, in line with historic promises that, for 
some offenders, life will most certainly mean life (Watt and Travis 2013; Kern 2014; Dyer 2002), 
directly conflicts with the judgement, and reasoning, of Vinter. When the decision for release rests 
with an elected, publicly accountable minister, the Vinter court was correct in its belief that there is 
no real prospect for release for whole life sentenced prisoners. Public opinion, and confidence in the 
criminal justice system, remain the decisive factors, above prisoner rehabilitation (Cavadino and 
Dignan 2002:275; Gould 1998). The threat, however, to the ECHR, by a founding member of the 
Council of Europe, was strong, 
If we cannot reach agreement that our courts and our parliament 
will have the final say over these matters then we will have to 
withdraw. We have the right to withdraw, it is specifically provided 
for in the convention. We would exercise that right. There is always 
a first time for everything… We cannot go on with a situation where 
crucial decisions about how this country is run and how we protect 
our citizens are taken by the ECHR and not by our parliament and 






Part 2: Hutchinson, the interim pacifier  
In Hutchinson1, two years after the Vinter judgement, the similar claim was presented to the Fourth 
Section of the Strasbourg Court: the imposition of a whole of life sentence was contrary to Article 3 
of the European Convention. However, the Fourth Section was to reach a different conclusion than 
the Grand Chamber in Vinter. In a withdrawal from the position set out in Vinter, Hutchinson’s claim 
was dismissed. However, this dismissal of the appellant’s claims was despite the assertion that the 
Hutchinson case was in fact a replica of the Vinter case that preceded it. However, nothing had 
changed in England & Wales, legally, after the Vinter decision, except an increased amount of 
defiance to the Strasbourg court from the judiciary, in the responding case of McLoughlin. Indeed, 
that lack of change was a key point in the dissenting opinion of Judge Kalaydjieva in Hutchinson;  
…the majority in the present case failed to express any view as to 
whether, how and at what point the interpretation of the domestic 
law established in Bieber (2009) and R v Newell; R v McLoughlin 
(2014) changed, ceased to apply or made the applicant’s situation 
more compatible with the principles laid down by the Grand 
Chamber in examining the situation of the applicants in Vinter 
(Dissent of Judge Kalaydjieva, Hutchinson v United Kingdom 2015).  
However, the majority felt that the McLoughlin court had satisfactorily answered the charges 
presented by the Grand Chamber in Vinter. Particularly, the Fourth Section noted the Court of 
Appeal’s strenuous assertion that the Secretary of State was bound to act compatibly with 
Convention rights, including Article 3, by virtue of the Human Rights Act (1998). The Strasbourg court 
was convinced by the McLoughlin court’s assertion that it was of no consequence that Chapter 12 of 
the Lifer Manual had not been revised by the Secretary of State, after Vinter, since he was bound to 
exercise his power in a manner compatible with Article 3. The exceptional circumstances referred to 
in McLoughlin would be elucidated by the circumstances of each case, and subject to judicial review; 
no further explanation was prudent or necessary since the meaning would evolve under common 
law. However, in more than thirty years, it is important to note, no whole life tariff prisoner has been 
released. Still, the Fourth Section held that the national court had specifically addressed the points 
of concern in the Vinter judgement and clarified, unequivocally, the domestic position.  
Whilst satisfactory for Britain, the appellant’s claim was accepted on referral by the Grand Chamber. 
The applicant argued, with merit, that his claim was indistinguishable from that in Vinter and the 
clarification offered in R v McLoughlin was, in substance, identical to that previously offered by the 
same court in previous cases (R v Bieber (2008) and R v Oakes (2012)). Also noted were the political 
statements after Vinter, undermining the domestic legal position, and, similarly, the contentious role 
of a government minister taking on a judicial function in determining release of whole life sentenced 
prisoners (Hutchinson v United Kingdom 2015 at 16).  
                                                          
1 Arthur Hutchinson was convicted of three counts of murder and one of rape in 1984 and sentenced to life 
imprisonment. At the time, the trial judge recommended a tariff of 18 years. Four years later the judge 
recommended a whole of life tariff “for the requirements of retribution and deterrence”. The Lord Chief 
Justice concurred, “I do not think that this man should ever be released, quite apart from the risk which would 
be involved”. In December 1994, it was communicated to Hutchinson that his tariff had been increased to one 




Part 3: Hutchinson in the Grand Chamber 
...the violation in Vinter rests on two grounds, the first one being the 
lack of certainty and the second one being the absence of a 
dedicated review mechanism. They remain untouched (Hutchinson v 
United Kingdom 2017, dissenting opinion of Pinto De Albuquerque 
at 16). 
In January 2017, by a vote of fourteen to three, the Grand Chamber held, in Hutchinson v United 
Kingdom, there had been no violation of Article 3. 
Hutchinson claimed that the review of whole life sentences was still vague, particularly when 
entrusted with a government minister, and that the chamber should rule that such a function should 
be entrusted to an independent judiciary, rather than a partisan politician. Such a vague system of 
review was compounded by the fact that the key terms ‘exceptional circumstances’ and 
‘compassionate grounds’ had not been sufficiently elucidated since the Vinter judgement, 
undermining any attempt at prisoner rehabilitation. This view is not without substance; the most 
infamous of whole life sentenced appellants in Britain, Myra Hindley, was widely recognised as a 
‘prison success story’ having earned a slew of favourable reports from those who worked with her; 
religious conversion; prisoner mentoring; and educational achievement, all of which could not 
overcome the adamant public view that she should never be release. The public, as demonstrated in 
the Hindley case, holds a powerful view when the decision to release rests with a publicly elected 
minister (Pettigrew 2016a; Pettigrew 2016b). In fact, neither Myra Hindley, nor any other life 
sentenced prisoner, had been released “in the way envisaged by Vinter” (Vinter v Hutchinson 2017 
at 31). The Grand Chamber, however, affirmed its position that it is for each State to determine 
whether sentence review is conducted by the executive or the judiciary. The Grand Chamber was 
mindful that the Secretary of State could order release of a whole life tariff prisoner at any time, 
despite no such order having ever been made, but it was not for the court to speculate how 
efficiently such a system, which it acknowledges is minimally regulated, might operate in practice 
(Hutchinson v United Kingdom 2017 at 69). In practice, there is no meaning to any review and 
regulation, when an elected government minister undertakes the ‘review’, it becomes coloured by 
public opinion. As Pettigrew notes, in regard to Hindley, 
If, for all Hindley’s efforts to improve herself whilst in prison (even if 
they were entirely self-serving, to impress those who could move 
her towards release) she was not deemed to have made 
“exceptional progress”, it is then hard to imagine any prisoner that 
could reach that point. Hindley devoted over three and a half 
decades to all the self-improvement and educational courses she 
was offered whilst in prison and still, that was not enough to 
persuade politicians (or the public) of a change in her character. 
Hindley has, in effect, placed the bar so high that for other prisoners 
with whole of life tariffs, after her death, and after her efforts for 
release, are left with very little hope of achieving release by that 
mechanism (Pettigrew 2016a:61) 
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Despite the role played by public opinion in the review of whole life sentences, the Grand Chamber 
maintained, in Hutchinson, that an executive review does not amount to a breach of the Convention 
and falls within the margin of appreciation given to member states. That holding is despite there 
being clear support in the international materials referred to in the Vinter case for review to be a 
judicial function (Hutchinson v United Kingdom 2017 at 28). 
Although the Court of Appeal, in McLoughlin, had noted the restrictive nature of the current release 
policy, that they had stated the Lifer Manual cannot restrict the duty of the Secretary of State to 
consider all circumstances relevant to release under section 30 of the Crime (Sentences) Act was 
enough to pacify the Grand Chamber. Noted by the Court of Appeal, and accepted by the Grand 
Chamber, the failure to reword and revise official policy in line with relevant statutory provisions and 
case law was inconsequential as a matter of domestic law,  
The Court considers that the Court of Appeal has brought clarity as 
to the content of the relevant domestic law, resolving the 
discrepancy identified in the Vinter judgement. Although Vinter 
contemplated that the policy might be replaced or quashed in the 
course of judicial review proceedings, the court notes the 
government’s submission that the Lifer Manual retains its validity in 
relation to release on compassionate (in the narrow sense of 
humanitarian) grounds. What is important is that, as confirmed in 
McLoughlin, this is just one of the circumstances in which the 
release of a prisoner may, or indeed must, be ordered (Hutchinson v 
United Kingdom 2017 at 40). 
The other circumstances remain unidentified.  
Key to the Grand Chamber’s retreat from Vinter, as in the Fourth Section, is the assertion of the 
Court of Appeal in McLoughlin that the power of the Secretary of State to order release form a 
whole life order is bound by the Human Rights Act (1998). Section 3 of the Act, regarding the 
interpretation of legislation states, “So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and 
subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the 
Convention rights” (Human Rights Act 1998 s.3). Furthermore, section 6, regarding the acts of public 
authorities, states “It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a 
Convention right” (Human Rights Act 1998 s.6). The obligations of the Human Rights Act, however, 
are somewhat undermined by successive declarations that, for some, ‘life will mean life’ (Watt & 
Travis 2013, Dyer 2002) and further jeopardised by repeated stated intentions to repeal that 
domestic legislation (Travis 2013; Conservatives 2014; Stone 2015; Stone 2016).  
In his dissent, Judge Pinto De Albuquerque recalled the Grand Chamber’s judgement of Murray v the 
Netherlands (2016), an intervening decision between Vinter and Hutchinson. In Murray it was held 
that a parole mechanism must comply with five binding principles: (1) the principle of legality; there 
must be a sufficient degree of clarity and certainty, (2) the principle of the assessment of the 
penological grounds for continued incarceration based on objective and pre-established criteria 
including special and general prevention (deterrence) as well as retribution, (3) the principle of 
assessment within a specified time frame, 25 years in the case of life sentenced prisoners, (4) the 
principle of fair procedural guarantees, including the obligation to give reasons for the decision not 
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to order the release of the prisoner, (5)the principle of judicial review. For Judge Pinto De 
Albuquerque those principles have now been disregarded, 
...having established the above-mentioned ‘relevant principles’, it 
could be expected that the Court had reached in Murray a point of 
no return in its standard-setting function for the protection of 
human rights of prisoners in Europe. Unfortunately this expectation 
proved to be wrong in the present case (Hutchinson v United 
Kingdom 2017, dissenting opinion of Judge Pinto De Albuquerque at 
10).  
The crux of his assertion is based on the lack of change since Vinter, and the still not clarified terms 
of reviewing life sentences; particularly the Court of Appeal in McLoughlin had not clarified what was 
meant by ‘exceptional circumstances’. Whilst the McLoughlin court held that it was of no legal 
consequence that the Lifer Manual had not been revised, Judge Pinto De Albuquerque points out the 
heading remains ‘compassionate release on medical grounds’ which shows the intention of s.30. For 
the McLoughlin court the wide meaning of compassionate grounds encompasses ‘legitimate 
penological reasons’ a view which was explicitly rejected by the Vinter court (at 129). As noted by 
Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, it was explicitly stated in Murray that penological grounds do not 
equate to, and should not be confused with compassionate grounds of ill health, physical integrity 
and old age (Murray v the Netherlands at 100). The unchanged lifer manual, issued by the Secretary 
of State as Prison Service Order 4700, still stipulates the criteria for release being restricted to cases 
when,  
...the prisoner is suffering from a terminal illness and death is likely 
to occur very shortly (although there are no set time limits, 3 
months may be considered to be an appropriate period for an 
application to be made to Public Protection Casework Section 
[PPCS]), or the ISP (Indeterminate Sentenced Prisoner) is bedridden 
or similarly incapacitated, for example, those paralysed or suffering 
from a severe stroke (Prison Service Order 4700) 
The Strasbourg court, on more than one occasion since the Vinter judgement, had faulted the lack of 
clear criteria that was to be taken into account in reviewing whole life sentences, so Hutchinson 
stands in contradiction to those cases (László Magyar v Hungary 2014; Trabelsi v Belgium 2014). In 
the László Magyar case the second section of the court was critical of the lack of specificity regarding 
the governing criteria and applicable conditions for exercising presidential clemency. The remedial 
suggestion was legislation that would enable prisoners to see ‘with some degree of precision’ what 
was required of them in order to be considered for release (László Magyar v Hungary 2014 at 71). 
The Fifth Section of the court went further in its direction for clear and specific guidance, referring to 
“objective, pre-established criteria of which the prisoner had precise cognisance at the time of 
imposition of the life sentence, whether, while serving his sentence, the prisoner has changed and 
progressed to such an extent that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate 
penological grounds” (Trabelsi v Belgium 2014 at 137). Britain rejects the need for pre-established 
criteria, holding that it is neither necessary nor practical to describe what a whole life sentenced 
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prisoner must do in order to be considered as having made exceptional progress towards their 
rehabilitation.  
Aptly pointed out in his dissenting opinion Judge Pinto De Albuquerque refers to the sentencing 
remarks of judges in recent English cases where sentences of whole life were imposed: R v Mair 
(2016) and R v Port (2016). 
[this offence] is of such a high level of exceptional seriousness that it 
can only properly be marked by a whole life sentence. That is the 
sentence which I pass. You will, therefore, only be released, if ever, 
by the Secretary of State exercising executive clemency on 
humanitarian grounds to permit you to die at home. Whether or not 
that occurs will be a matter for the holder of that office at the time 
(R v Mair 2016) 
The sentence therefore upon the counts of murder is a sentence of 
life imprisonment; I decline to set a minimum term; the result is a 
whole life sentence and the defendant will die in prison (R v Port 
2016) 
This is the assumption of the judiciary based on, ostensibly, a literal meaning, not a wide 
interpretation of s.30, as asserted by the court in McLoughlin; a whole life sentence is just that, short 
of being ‘reduced’ on compassionate grounds to allow the prisoner to die at home, a prison term 
with a true meaning.      
In essence then, the claims made in Vinter remain valid; the domestic law remains unchanged, there 
is no case law that illuminates any meaning given to exceptional circumstances, the ‘Lifer Manual’ – 
the only document accessible to whole life prisoners that can inform them of what is required of 
them to be considered for release – has not been revised for clarity. The Fourth Section and Grand 
Chamber judgements wholly rely on the elucidation of the law in McLoughlin which, in reality, is no 
elucidation at all; the life sentenced prisoner still does not know, at the time of sentence, or at any 
point, what they can do to enhance their prospect for release. As discussed elsewhere, the threshold 
would seem to be very high (Pettigrew 2016a; 2016b) and, it should be remembered that still no 
whole life sentenced prisoner has been released. Moreover, as highlighted in recent cases, just 
weeks before the Grand Chamber published its judgement, judges in Britain are imposing whole life 
orders fully expecting that the recipients will spend their natural life in prison, notwithstanding the 
slim chance that they may be allowed to die at home (Sentencing Remarks of Mr Justice Wilkie, R v 
Thomas Mair (2016)). What has changed, after Vinter, is the strength and depth of animosity 
towards the Strasbourg court in Westminster. Indeed, political intimidation has taken on a very real 
substance seen, for example, in the domestic widening of the scope of whole life orders in a 
European climate that sees the rest of Europe moving away from literal life sentencing.     
 
Part 4: Concluding Remarks 
The majority’s decision represents a peak in a growing trend 
towards downgrading the role of the Court before certain domestic 
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jurisdictions, with the serious risk that the Convention is applied 
with double standards (Hutchinson v United Kingdom 2017, 
dissenting opinion of Judge Pinto De Albuquerque at 38) 
The decision of the Grand Chamber in Hutchinson resonates more widely than the 65 whole life 
sentenced prisoners currently incarcerated in England & Wales (Ministry of Justice 2017:3). Indeed, 
it resonates more widely than the individual issue of whole life prison sentences and mechanisms for 
release and parole. The reversal of the Grand Chamber, with no action taken by England & Wales in 
response to the concerns raised in Vinter other than the Court of Appeal’s proclamation that the 
domestic law was good law, raises questions regarding the extent to which the ECHR is influenced by 
political pressure both directly, in this case, and that found within the wider climate of growing Euro 
scepticism. Indeed, that climate is one which is increasingly hostile towards the Strasbourg court 
(Hutchinson v United Kingdom 2017, dissenting opinion of Judge Pinto De Albuquerque at 38).  
Appropriately noted in the dissent of Judge Pinto De Albuquerque are the words of Lord Hoffman, 
When we joined, indeed, took the lead in the negotiation of the 
European Convention, it was not because we thought it would affect 
our own law, but because we thought it right to set an example for 
others and to help to ensure that all the Member States respected 
those basic human rights which were not culturally determined but 
reflected our common humanity (cited in the dissenting opinion of 
Judge Pinto De Albuquerque, Hutchinson v United Kingdom 2017 at 
39) 
When founding countries believe that human rights are for export not import, and condemn the 
imposition of ‘alien jurisprudence’ upon them, the legitimacy of the court should overpower any 
such complaints. However, when those member states are given a wider margin appreciation, for 
their placation, the legitimacy of the court suddenly rests on quicksand. This is not the first instance 
of such latitude being given to hardened domestic opinion that contradicts the court’s findings and 
philosophy. On the issue of prisoner voting (Hirst v United Kingdom No 2 2005) the court found a 
breach of the convention but after years of the UK failing to implement the ruling it was not 
sanctioned in anyway; a policy of diplomatic restraint suggesting that “officials in Strasbourg do not 
wish to antagonise any further the UK's increasingly fraught relations with the ECHR” (Bowcott 
2012). Since that time, a litany of issues, and the ECHR’s pronouncement of them, has resonated 
negatively with Britain and, it would seem, in response to increasing hostility and substantial threats 
to repeal the Human Rights Act which demands compliance with the ECHR, the Strasbourg court has 
responded with a measure of favourability. Whilst such a move may prevent, in the short term, the 
departure of a key Member State from the remit of the Strasbourg Court, it simultaneously casts 
doubt upon its legitimacy, objectivity, and future role as arbiter of universal human rights in Europe. 
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